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Abstract 
This paper addresses whether children’s exposure to parents receiving disability 
benefits induces a higher probability of receiving such benefits themselves. Most 
OECD countries experience an increasing proportion of the working-age population 
receiving permanent disability benefits. Using data from Norway, a country where 
around 10% of the working-age population rely on disability benefits, we find that the 
amount of time that children are exposed to their fathers receiving disability benefits 
affects their own likelihood of receiving benefits positively. This finding is robust to a 
range of different specifications, including family fixed effects. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In the US and most of Western Europe, the share of the working-age population living 
on a disability pension (DP) is increasing (OECD 2010a, Autor and Duggan 2003, 
2006). Together with an aging population, this is an increasingly important policy 
issue. Several aspects make this a concern. The rising number of disability pensioners 
itself puts a strain on public finances. Moreover, reduced fertility rates and increasing 
longevity combined with low average retirement ages adds to a worsened dependency 
ratio. Put together, these are factors that question the sustainability of the existing 
welfare states. To the extent that some people on disability benefits could have been 
working, there may also be individual costs in terms of foregone earnings and social 
exclusion that result from being outside the labor force.  
The increasing DP trend is not reflected in deterioration in general health. On 
the contrary, standard health indicators suggest improved public health.1 The 
combination of improved public health and rising disability rolls is encountered in 
many Western countries; see Autor (2011) for a recent discussion of the US case. This 
observation has lead researchers to test other mechanisms and routes to DPs. One 
obvious candidate stems from the innate moral hazard problems enforced by the 
generosity of the disability insurance systems. In the US, there is a long series of 
contributions discussing the incentives produced by US disability programs, such as 
Parsons (1980), Leonard (1986), Bound (1989), Chen and van der Klaauw (2008) and 
Autor (2011). Börsch-Supan (2007) compares the EU15 countries plus the US, and 
finds, after controlling for demographic structure and health status, a substantial cross-
national variation in DP enrolment rates. As much as three quarters of the variation, he 
                                                 
1 See for instance OECD (2010b).  
2 
 
claims, is due to country-specific disability insurance rules. Furthermore, Bratsberg et 
al. (2010) show that a large percentage of disability insurance claims can be directly 
attributed to job displacement and other adverse shocks to employment opportunities 
and therefore conclude that unemployment and disability insurance are close 
substitutes, at least in Norway. Rege et al. (2007) report substantial social interaction 
effects in DP participation among older workers after plant downsizing. Hence, DP, in 
addition to being a social insurance against severe health losses, also appears to be 
influenced by the labor market and social norms. Norms are established at home and 
transferred from parents to children. Our intension in this paper is to disentangle the 
different ways through which parental disability is transferred to the next generation.  
Parents’ influence on children’s outcome has been studied within many 
different fields and from many different angles. As one would expect, economists have 
been focused on the transmission of economic status from one generation to the next. 
In particular, there is a vast literature on income mobility across generations, expressed 
by the estimation of intergenerational earnings elasticities; see Solon (1999) and Black 
and Devereux (2011) for overviews and Bratberg et al. (2005), Bratsberg et al. (2007), 
and Nilsen et al. (2012) for Norwegian assessments. In later years, however, we have 
witnessed a growing interest in other aspects of intergenerational transmission. 
Examples, surveyed in Black and Devereux (2011), are education, health, welfare 
participation, jobs and occupation, consumption, attitudes, etc. Moreover, it has 
become increasingly common to address the causal mechanisms underlying the 
intergenerational correlations. 
As for DP, Kristensen et al. (2004) report a relatively strong positive 
association across generations. Note however, this association is to be interpreted as a 
causal link only if the child becomes a DP receiver because of his/her parents 
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receiving the same pension. This is a point that is made in several earlier papers, most 
of them based on analysis of intergenerational transmission of welfare benefits and/or 
welfare participation; see Duncan et al. (1988), Gottschalk (1990), Levine and 
Zimmerman (1996), Pepper (2000), Page and Stevens (2002), and Mitnik (2010) for 
US and Canadian analysis.2 Stenberg (2000), Edmark and Hanspers (2011), and 
Lorentzen (2010) are recent analysis from Sweden and Norway, respectively. The 
Scandinavian welfare model differs somewhat from the other Western economies, 
notably the Anglo–American, in its relatively extensive use of unitarian, health-related 
social insurance, e.g., DP, at the expense of means-tested welfare benefits. Contrary to 
welfare benefits, DP is an absorbing state, meaning that once an individual enters this 
form of benefit scheme, he/she rarely returns to self-support. In an ideal world with 
perfect information, DP simply serves as insurance against health-related loss of the 
ability to work. In reality, however, DP may be used as an early retirement route even 
if ability to work has not changed. 
There is obvious scope for parents to affect children’s propensity to become 
disability benefit receivers. Children inherit their parents’ propensity to become 
welfare receivers (partly) as a result of negative impacts from the welfare system. Such 
adverse influences can be the result of values, attitudes, and behaviors of parents and 
neighbors and/or a decrease in the stigma associated with the welfare system. It may 
also be because of the development of self-defeating work attitudes and poor work 
ethics. 
On the other hand, a positive association might also reflect (observed and 
unobserved) characteristics of the family that might have been present before the 
parent became a DP receiver. In that case, the observed relationship between the DP 
                                                 
2 For an overview of the sociological literature, see for instance Corcoran (1995) 
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behavior of parents and children could turn out to be spurious. For example, 
individuals at the lower end of the earnings distribution are far more likely to end up as 
DP receivers than those at the upper end. The income of a pension receiver is further 
reduced compared with the earnings before receiving DP. As in Levine and 
Zimmerman (1996), the correlation between DP status and their status as low-income 
earners makes it difficult to separate the intergenerational transmission of DP from the 
intergenerational transmission of earnings.3 If disabled parents provide limited 
educational opportunities, live in substandard neighborhoods, etc., it may affect the 
children’s education, their probability of living in the same neighborhood, receiving 
social insurance and, ultimately, the probability of ending up on public benefits. In 
such cases, we will observe a strong correlation between parents’ and children’s DP, 
but it will be misleading to argue that parents’ DP is causing the children’s receipt of a 
pension. An even more obvious example is health. Poor health is a necessary 
qualification for the eligibility of DP. At the same time, it is often the case that children 
inherit poor health from their parents. Hence, health is clearly a potential confounding 
factor in our attempt to isolate the causal mechanisms behind receiving DP. 
In this paper we investigate whether children’s probability of becoming DP 
receivers increases the longer they are exposed to parents whom themselves receive 
DP. This has the potential of taking our understanding one step further regarding the 
way DP is transmitted between generations: genetic susceptibility is congenital and 
will not be altered, while children are more likely to pick up their parents’ attitudes and 
behavior the longer the duration of exposure. In the analysis we consider the 
probability of DP for the offspring before the age of 40; hence, we do not restrict the 
                                                 
3 The authors study mother–daughter correlation for the receipt of American Aid to Families 
with Dependent Children (AFDC). In terms of Levine and Zimmerman (1996), “the poverty 
trap will confound the estimation of the welfare trap” (p.3). 
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transmission to take place while the children are living with their parents.4,5 The 
analyses are performed on a sample of Norwegian siblings. The ability to identify 
siblings is an important characteristic of our data, allowing us to control for fixed, 
unobserved heterogeneity within families. To illustrate the advantage of a family fixed-
effect, it may be informative to consider specific sources of parents’ state of disability, 
e.g. addiction. According to medical research addiction is to some degree hereditary 
(Kendler et al., 2007). Moreover, being exposed to parents being DP receivers because 
of, for example, alcohol addiction obviously has adverse effects on children in the 
family; increasing, in turn, their own likelihood of becoming DP receivers. The focus 
of this paper is the latter effect controlling for the former, which is exactly the virtue of 
the family fixed-effect model. Genetic susceptibility is common for the siblings in a 
given family and, hence, is integrated out in the fixed-effect model, while the exposure 
varies according to the ages during which the siblings were confronted with their 
parents’ addiction and DP status.6  
By focusing on Norway, we have access to data that enables us to calculate 
parent–child correlation but also, more importantly, to explore the mechanisms 
underlying the intergenerational correlations in DP receipts. Norway has also 
experienced rising rates of DP payments for several decades, and currently has one of 
the world’s highest disability rates at 9.5% of the population aged 18–67, according to 
the National Insurance Administration (persons on temporary disability benefits not 
                                                 
4 It is possible that the younger children move out relatively earlier as a response to the DP 
state of their parents (this information is not available in our data). In that case, it may be 
argued that our measure of exposure will be underestimated for the youngest siblings. 
5 In the remainder of this paper we will use the terms child and offspring interchangeably 
independent of the age of the child/offspring. 
6 To the degree that the parents’ receipt of DP is an indicator of poor health, their health 
condition might influence their opportunities and abilities to take care of their children. If so, 
this is a case where parents’ poor health affects the children adversely and ultimately might 
influence their probability of becoming DP receivers. Furthermore, one must assume that this 
effect increases with duration of exposure. 
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included). No corresponding deterioration in general health has been documented. On 
the contrary, standard health indicators, objective as well as subjective, point in the 
direction of improved public health (see for instance Norwegian Institute of Public 
Health). The Norwegian data have several advantages. First, they are full population 
registry data with information on receivers as well as nonreceivers of social insurance 
benefits, and the representativeness of the sample is not an issue. Second, we have 
longitudinal information on social insurance, making it possible to infer the age of the 
offspring when a parent started receiving DP. Thus, we are able to construct a variable 
that measures children’s exposure time to parents’ receipt of DP. Third, because our 
data include siblings, we can control for unobserved family effects. Finally, with data 
on both parents, we are able to analyze differences in the correlations between son–
father, son–mother, daughter–father, and daughter–mother. 
Our analysis shows that there is a positive correlation in the probability of 
receiving disability benefits between children and parents. We also find that the 
amount of time a child is exposed to parents’ receipt of DP benefits affects children’s 
likelihood of receiving disability benefits. Finally, when separating the 
intergenerational transmission of DP from the transmission of family fixed effects, the 
negative and statistically significant effects of exposure to parents’ disability benefits is 
still present. Several robustness checks are performed. First, one-child families are 
added to the sibling sample. Second, different age group variables are employed to 
measure the duration of exposure. Third, “stable” families are estimated separately. 
None of the robustness checks reject our main finding; the longer children are exposed 
to parents’ receipt of disability benefits the higher their own likelihood of receiving 
disability benefits. 
7 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the 
institutional background. Our data are presented in Section 3, while the empirical 
model is discussed in Section 4. Our results are discussed in Section 5, while some 
concluding remarks are given in Section 6. 
 
2. Background and Institutional Details 
 
The Norwegian Act of Disability was passed by the Parliament in 1960. In 1967 it was 
integrated with a comprehensive social insurance scheme called The National 
Insurance Scheme (NIS). The NIS encompasses the old age retirement scheme, 
sickness benefits, disability benefits, unemployment insurance, and health insurance. In 
principle the NIS gives full population coverage, with defined benefits based on 
earnings histories. 
All employees who have been with the same employer for at least four weeks 
are covered by the mandatory sickness insurance scheme, which stands out as very 
generous compared with other countries. Sickness benefits are paid by the employer 
for the first two weeks, and then by the NIS for a maximum of 50 weeks. Individuals 
with permanent impairments may apply for disability benefits, roughly corresponding 
to old-age pensions. The application must be certified by a physician. Furthermore, the 
NIS supplies benefits for participants in medical and vocational rehabilitation. Old-age 
pension is a mandatory defined-benefit system, which includes an earnings-based 
supplementary benefit in addition to a fixed minimum pension benefit. Disability 
benefits are, roughly speaking, calculated as the old-age benefits the beneficiary would 
have been entitled to had he/she continued working until the age of 67, the ordinary 
retirement age. The average DP compensation ratio is 50–60%. To be eligible for 
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disability benefits, relevant rehabilitation should have been attempted. Rehabilitation 
benefits are roughly the same as disability benefits. 
The sickness and disability insurance schemes both place heavy burdens on 
the Norwegian welfare state. Direct expenditures associated with the sick leave scheme 
are in the order of 2.5% of GDP and workdays lost constitute 6.5% of total working 
hours. The disability benefit recipiency rate, i.e. the number of DP recipients as a share 
of population aged 18–67, is very high in Norway compared with other OECD 
countries. Numbers reported by OECD (see OECD 2010a, Figure 2.9), state that in 
2008 the recipiency rate was a little higher than 10% in Norway, while the 
corresponding number for the OECD on average was just below 6%. The evolution 
over time is shown in Figure 1, covering the period 1980–2011. The stock of disability 
pensioners rose steadily through the 1970s and 1980s, stabilized in the early 1990s 
following a stricter admission policy, increased again from the mid-1990s, and has 
decreased somewhat from the turn of the century. As of late 2011, 9.5% of the 
population aged 18–67 are disability pensioners. In 2004 a reform introduced 
temporary disability benefits that could be granted for a maximum of four years. In 
2010, the temporary disability benefits were abolished and replaced with a new 
temporary benefits program that also includes previous rehabilitation benefits. 
 
[Figure 1: Evolvement of the disability benefit recipiency rate in Norway] 
[Figure 2: The disability benefit recipiency rate by age and sex] 
 
Figure 2 shows that the probability of ending up on disability benefits increases 
exponentially with age. As for age 60, we see that approx. 35% of the female 
population are receiving disability benefits, while the corresponding numbers for men 
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is 24%. At age 66, one year prior to the standard pension age in Norway, the 
corresponding numbers are 49% and 40% (women and men, respectively). This is 
shown in Figure 2. 
Unlike many other European countries, Norway had no general early 
retirement scheme until 1989, when a program was introduced, which covered 
employees in the public sector and about half the private sector from the age of 62. The 
substitution from disability to this scheme was moderate (Bratberg et al. 2004). In 
2011 a major reform of the pension system was introduced, where flexible retirement 
from the age of 62 is an integral part. This reform does not affect our analysis, which 
covers DPs granted up to the 2004 reform. 
 
3. Data and Sample 
 
We use data from Norwegian registers covering the entire population, provided by 
Statistics Norway. Importantly, the data include parent–child links via personal 
identifiers. The database includes earnings data starting in 1967 and other background 
information with yearly updates from 1986. We also have longitudinal data from the 
Norwegian Labour and Welfare Administration (NAV) including information on DP 
receipts. The NAV data include two variables that are relevant for determining when a 
person started receiving DP: the first date for actual receipt of DP, and the date when 
the sickness spell leading to DP started, typically several years before receipt (but the 
individual benefits from other social insurance benefits in the meantime). The DP-start 
variable is censored in 1991, but not the other variable, which covers spells back to 
1966. In the analysis, we base the outcome of children on actual DP starts (the 
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censored variable) while we use the other variable to assess the DP status of parents.7 
The NAV data are limited to individuals below the retirement age (67) in 1991, thus 
we do not include parents born before 1925. 
In the analysis we consider the probability of DP for the child before the age of 
40, using the cohorts born 1951–1963, with DP status measured in 1991–2003. The 
1963/2003 restriction is because of the reform in 2004 that introduced temporary 
disability benefits, see the previous section. This reform implied that some individuals 
who would have been granted permanent DP in the old regime were now granted 
temporary benefits, but also some who were accepted into the new program might have 
been rejected permanent benefits. As we want to focus on the time children are 
exposed to parents’ disability, we exclude observations for children whose father 
received disability benefits starting before the child was born. This gives us a sample 
of 334,995 father–child and 374,307 mother–child pairs. As we shall discuss in the 
next section, the main analyses are performed on a sample of siblings, i.e., single 
children are excluded. The siblings sample includes 257,705 and 289,032 father–child 
and mother–child pairs, respectively. Results using the full sample are reported in the 
appendix. To define the outcome variable (DP before the age of 40) we chose the year 
of entrance into the absorbing state of permanent DP. This is also consistent with how 
disability rates are reported in public statistics. For parents, it is reasonable to assume 
that a potential effect on children begins before DP is actually granted, thus the 
available variable is well suited for the purpose. The main explanatory variables are 
indicators for parental DP receipts, and an interaction term between this indicator and 
dummies for offspring age intervals at the beginning of the parental sickness spell 
                                                 
7 The time span between the initial sickness spell and actual DP start varies greatly, with an 
average of about 4.5 years and a standard deviation of the same magnitude for 35–39 year olds. 
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leading to DP. We control for child and parental cohorts, birth order, parental 
education, parents’ age at childbirth, and family income (average for offspring age 16–
19 in 10,000 1989 NOK).  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the siblings sample that is used in 
the main analysis. We note that 4% of male offspring and 5% of female offspring are 
DP receivers at age 40, while 44% of fathers and 45% of mothers become DP receivers 
during the observation period, indicating that despite the necessity of a medical 
diagnosis, DP to some extent may work as an early retirement. We also note that on 
average fathers are born in 1930 and mothers in 1933, and were respectively 28 and 25 
years old when the children in the sample were born. Mothers on average are 
significantly less educated than fathers, reflecting the fact that they grew up in the 
1930s and 1940s before the educational explosion.  
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Table 2 shows family characteristics by fathers’ disability status, where DP = 1 
indicates that the father became a disability recipient before the son/daughter was 40. 
We note that the groups are quite similar with regard to cohort and age at childbirth, 
but parents in the DP group are less educated. This latter group also has lower incomes, 
but as incomes are not necessarily measured before DP was granted, the difference is 
not only due to lower labor market earnings. The DP families are slightly larger, 
indicated by three or more children. 
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4. Econometric Model 
 
A simple linear probability model for intergenerational correlation in DP, dp, is 
 
(1)  , 
 
where 1(.) is the indicator operator, subscripts ij denote individual i from family j, and 
the superscripts c and p denote child and parent, respectively. For sons and daughters, 
dp is measured at age 40, for parents, dpjp = 1 indicates disability before the offspring 
is 40. Xij is a vector of family (parent and child) characteristics, fj is family-specific 
unobservables that may affect the outcome, and uij is a random error term. If there is a 
correlation in the probability of DP between the generations, we expect  > 0.  
If fj is correlated to dpjp,  will be biased by unobserved characteristics present 
in the family before the father became a DP recipient. Typically, this would be 
hereditary factors that affect health, or differences in family preferences. If we have 
several observations on each family (i.e. a couple of siblings), the model could be 
purged of fj by treating it as an unobserved family fixed effect.8 Note however, the way 
equation (1) specifies no variation in dpjp in family j. On the other hand, if there is a 
learning effect in the intergenerational transfer of disability, we would expect the 
child’s disability probability to be increasing in the time he/she is exposed to parental 
disability. Exposure time will vary between siblings, thus a siblings fixed-effect 
estimator becomes available by interacting dpjp with exposure. To implement this, we 
let aijc denote the age of the child when the parent became disabled and augment (1) to 
                                                 
8 Ekhaugen (2009) exploits sibling variation in a recent paper on intergenerational correlation 
in unemployment. 
ijjij
p
j
c
ij ufXdpdpP   )1(1)1(
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(2) , 
 
where a1 < a2 etc. If exposure time matters, we expect 1 > 2 > 3 > 4. In the main 
analysis we use age intervals 1–15, 16–20, 21–30, and 31–40. The first disability spells 
in the data start in 1966 when the 1951 (child) cohort was aged 15, hence the upper 
limit in the first age interval. The next age interval, 16–20, covers the period before 
most children started to study, and therefore, moved out of their parents’ home. In the 
appendix we also report results for the cohorts 1957–1963 with 1–10 and 11–20 as the 
first age intervals.9 The vector of explanatory variables, Xij includes child and parental 
cohort dummies, birth order dummies, father’s and mother’s education and age at 
childbirth, and family income. By controlling for cohorts, we avoid time trends in 
disability rates leading to spurious results. We estimate (2) by OLS and with siblings 
fixed effect. It is worth pointing out that with the siblings fixed effect, one is utilizing 
variation in the data within each family. All the variation between families is “swept 
out” by the fixed effects. Thus it is likely that the statistical significance decreases. 
Finally, earlier research on birth order effects, see for instance Black et al. (2005), and 
Lindahl (2008) lead us to expect that younger siblings have a disadvantage. Thus, 
controlling for birth order may also be crucial. 
 
  
                                                 
9 Alternatively to equation (2), exposure could have been modeled linearly as 1(dpjp=1)*aijc. 
The dummy formulation was chosen because aijc is censored from below, at age 3 for the 1963 
cohort, up to age 15 for the 1951 cohort. 
ijjij
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5. Results 
 
Table 3 presents the effect of fathers’ DP on their children’s probability of becoming 
disability receivers. In the upper block, sons and daughters are pooled, whereafter they 
are estimated separately (mid and lower blocks).  
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
Column (1) presents the OLS results, with no controls. As expected, there 
exists a strong and highly significant effect. From the descriptive statistics in Table 1 
we see that 4% of the children in our sample become disability receivers before they 
turn 40 (3% of the sons and 5% of the daughters, respectively). This probability 
increases to 4.2% for sons (3% + 1.2%) and to 6.3% for daughters (5% + 1.3%). In 
relative terms these increases are quite substantial (29% and 21% for sons and 
daughters, respectively). 
However, the revealed correlation does not answer the questions we ask in this 
paper. First, we want test whether the correlation is related to the time the children are 
exposed to their parents being disability receivers. For this we use the constructed 
indicators for different periods of the children’s lives: ages 0–15, 16–20, 21–30, and 
31–40, respectively. The first indicator covers the period up until high school,10 the 
second, the high school period, while the final two represents periods of early and mid-
adult life. In other words, we allow social interaction to play a role between and within 
families also after the children (typically) have left home. Column (2) sheds light on 
this hypothesis. We find the strongest effect for those children that were exposed early 
                                                 
10 Too small samples prevent us performing more detailed stratifications. 
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in their lives and, hence, experienced disabled parents for the longest time. For 
example, children being exposed at the age of 0–15 have a 6.5% higher probability of 
becoming DP receivers themselves compared with children of the same age with 
nonreceiving parents. The effect decreases monotonically the higher the age group and 
the shorter the exposure. 
In columns (3) and (4) we control for possible confounding factors, still within 
an OLS framework. Recent research indicates that younger siblings are at a 
disadvantage with respect to outcome in adult life, notably education (Black et al. 
2005). Hence, we control for birth order’s possible association to the receipt of DP 
(column (3)). As discussed in the introductory section, we do not want to confound 
fathers’ disability with low earnings and low education (controlled for in column (4)). 
We see that inclusion of controls have only minor effects on our estimates. The 
coefficient decreases somewhat, particularly for the youngest group.11 Turning to the 
differences between sons and daughter in blocks two and three, we see the same 
pattern as before we divided the effect of fathers’ disability into periods of exposure, 
namely a stronger effect on daughters compared with that on sons. 
It is reassuring that our estimates of the effect of different degrees of exposure 
survive the extension of the analysis to include several individual and parental 
characteristics. However, the fundamental question of unobserved heterogeneity must 
be addressed before we can claim any causal interpretation of our findings. It might 
very well be unobserved characteristics of a certain family, present before as well as 
after the father receive DP, that is driving the intergenerational correlation; an obvious 
candidate being bad health inherited from parent to child. Therefore, we include family 
                                                 
11 It even becomes negatively significant for the oldest group - a result that vanishes in our 
preferred model. 
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fixed effects in columns (5) and (6). Hence, we forsake the variation between families 
in our sample, and isolate any effect that stems from the variation within families. To 
the degree that genes matter in deciding the correlation, e.g. through inherited weak 
health, it is integrated out by playing an identical role for all siblings in the respective 
family.12 In the pooled sample (upper block) we see that the effect from long exposure 
diminishes compared with the OLS results, but that is what one might expect when all 
the between family effects are omitted. The significantly positive effect remains, 
though, before as well as after controlling for observable confounders.13 The pattern is 
more or less the same for sons and daughters, but significant only at the 5% level for 
sons in the 16–20 age group. The reduced significance is likely to stem from the small 
sample sizes of age groups relative to the pooled sample. 
It should be noted that when we apply the siblings fixed effects model, only 
siblings who are found in different age intervals contribute to the identification of the 
exposure variable. There is a trade-off between having more detailed age intervals, and 
the number of variables to be identified. In Table A1 we report how many of the 
observations actually contribute to the identification. We see that the variation is 
smallest in the 0–15 interval, thus there is little scope for finer intervals for those who 
were exposed at the youngest age. 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
                                                 
12 As always in fixed-effect models, this rests on the assumption of common trends within each 
group. 
13 The fixed-effect formulation means that only birth order remains relevant, while parental 
earnings and education become part of the fixed effect. 
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In Table 4, we report a similar intergenerational effect between mothers and 
children. The OLS results resemble the ones for fathers. However, when we turn to the 
family fixed-effect formulation, the coefficients tend to be smaller in magnitude, and 
the effect of having a mother on DP is significant only for the 0–15 age group and at 
the 10% level. When we split the sample into sons and daughters, none of the 
coefficients are significant at conventional levels. Hence, unobserved family effects 
appear to play a more important role for the intergenerational correlation between 
mothers and children than for fathers and children. 
So far the reported regressions were based on a sample of siblings. To check 
whether this introduces any selection problems, we run the various OLS regressions for 
the full sample including families with only children. The results, reported in Tables 
A2 and A3, are quite similar to the OLS results in Tables 3 and 4, implying that biases 
due to the selection of families with more than one child is not an issue. 
As noted in the data section, the uneven exposure time intervals used in Tables 
3 and 4 reflect data limitations with regard to the first disability spells. If we exclude 
the 1951–1956 cohorts, we are able to split the exposure dummy at the age of 10 for 
the remaining cohorts, 1957–1963. These additional analyses are reported in Tables A4 
and A5. The point estimates are quite close to the main results. However, the effect of 
fathers’ DP on sons in the first age interval, which was significant in the FE 
regressions in Table 3, now turns out to be insignificant, possibly because of the 
reduced sample size. 
Family dissolutions may affect the outcomes of the children—it is reasonable 
that the influence of a parent who moves out could be reduced. Therefore, we have also 
estimated the sibling model on a subsample of “stable” families to ensure that the 
parents are living together. The data do not include continuous observations on 
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parents’ marital status, but we have census data from 1970 and 1980, and yearly 
records from 1987. The 1970 data also include marital duration. Thus we can back-
track marital status from 1980–1987 to childbirth, and define the family as stable if the 
parents are married at all observation points.14 In the main analysis, 87.5% of the 
sample belongs to stable families according to this definition. Tables A6 and A7 show 
the results. In sum, they are quite similar to the main results, but the effect of fathers’ 
DP on sons does not quite survive in the fixed-effect regressions. Mothers’ DP still has 
no effect when controlling for family fixed effects. Taking into account the reduced 
sample size and the strict stability definition, we conclude that our main conclusions 
are unchanged by this exercise. 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
 
In this paper we address the growing concern caused by rapidly rising disability rolls in 
several OECD countries. A particular reason for these concerns is that disability 
retirement for all practical purposes is an absorbing state. Thus, the increasing number 
of disability pensioners adds to the burden of unfavorable dependence ratios brought 
about by demographic changes. We focus on a particular aspect: a possible spillover 
effect between generations. Such an alleged spillover represents additional costs that 
are likely to be ignored in an analysis based on individuals instead of families. Our 
paper attempts to measure empirically to what degree children inherit their parents’ 
propensity of becoming DP receivers. In doing so, we link the literature on disability 
                                                 
14 The definition of stable depends on the cohort and is stricter for the older cohorts. For the 
1951 cohort, our definition implies no parental break-up before offspring are aged 29, age 28 
for the 1952 cohort, and so on to age 20 for the 1960 cohort. For the youngest cohorts the age 
limits are 26, 25, and 24. 
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insurance to the literature on intergenerational transmission of welfare benefits. DP is 
social insurance against severe health loss, but the probability of becoming a pension 
receiver also appears to be influenced by social norms, partly established in the homes 
and distributed from parents to children. 
Norway is typical in the sense that the disability rates have increased 
dramatically since 1980 while on the other hand, public health has improved; trends 
similar to those described by Autor (2011) for the US. Fortunately, Norwegian data are 
also exceptionally rich by being based on full population registers, allowing parent–
child links by personal identifiers, and covering a period long enough to address 
intergenerational correlations. In addition to having a number of control variables, the 
data also allow us to identify siblings. Thus we can consider the importance of 
exposure, and apply a family fixed effects model to separate the effect of parental 
disability receipts from unobserved family characteristics. 
Our OLS results indicate a positive correlation in the probability of receiving 
disability benefits between children and parents. The effect is strongest for the children 
that experienced disabled parents for the longest time. Turning to the differences 
between fathers and mothers and sons and daughters, we observe a slightly stronger 
effect on daughters compared with that on sons, no matter which parent receives the 
benefit. 
In our preferred model we restrict any effect stemming from the variation 
within and not between families. This integrates out (time invariant) unobserved family 
characteristics and takes us closer to a causal interpretation of our covariations. The 
significantly positive effect from father to children remains, before as well as after 
controlling for observable confounders, as long as we pool sons and daughters. When 
separating sons and daughters and thereby further reducing the sample size, the pattern 
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is more or less the same, but barely significant at the 5% level. The mother–children 
effect does not survive the fixed effect model, however. 
The existence of a spillover effect between generations implies that DP is not 
only a concern for the receiving generation, but also for their children. The apparent 
pattern revealed in our paper calls for increased effort in preventing disability 
retirement, particularly in families with children that are facing long exposure time. On 
the other hand, the same spillover effect represents an extra potential for policies that 
manage to lower the DP uptake: the positive effect can be carried on to the next 
generation. 
  
21 
 
References 
 
Autor, D. H. (2011) “The unsustainable rise of the disability rolls in the United States: 
Causes, consequences, and policy options.” NBER, No. 17697. 
Autor, D. H., and M. G. Duggan (2003). “The rise in the disability rolls and the decline 
in unemployment.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(1), 157–205. 
Autor, D. H., and M. G. Duggan (2006) “The growth in the social security disability 
rolls: A fiscal crisis unfolding.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 20(3), 71–96. 
Black, S., P. Devereux and K. Salvanes (2005) “The more the merrier? The effect of 
family composition on children’s outcomes”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
120 (2), 669-700.  
Black, S., and P. Devereux (2011) “The recent developments in intergenerational 
mobility” (eds. Ashenfelter, O. C., and D. Card), Handbook of Labor Economics, 
Vol. 4B, Chapter 16, Elsevier, Amsterdam. 
Bound, J. (1989) “The health and earnings of rejected disability insurance applicants.” 
American Economic Review, 79(3), 482–503. 
Börsch-Supan, A. (2007) “Work disability, health, and incentive effects.” Discussion 
Paper No. 07-23, Mannheim: Mannheim Institute for the Economics of Aging, 
University of Mannheim, Germany. 
Bratberg, E., T. H. Holmås, and Ø. Thøgersen (2004) “Assessing the effects of an early 
retirement program.” Journal of Population Economics, 17(3), 387–408. 
Bratberg, E., Ø. A. Nilsen, and K. Vaage (2005) “Intergenerational earnings mobility 
in Norway: Levels and trends.” Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 107(3), 
419–435. 
Bratsberg, B., K. Røed, O. Raaum, R. Naylor, M. Jäntti, T. Eriksson, and E. 
Österbacka (2007) “Nonlinearities in intergenerational earnings mobility: 
Consequences for cross-country comparisons.” Economic Journal, 117(519), 
C72–92. 
Bratsberg, B., E. Fevang, and K. Røed (2010) “Disability in the welfare state: An 
unemployment problem in disguise?” IZA Discussion Paper No. 4897. 
Chen, S., and W. van der Klaauw (2008) “The work disincentive effects of the 
disability insurance program in the 1990s.” Journal of Econometrics, 142(2), 
757–784. 
22 
 
Corcoran, M. (1995) “Rags to rags: Poverty and mobility in the United States.” Annual 
Review of Sociology, 21, 237–267. 
Duncan, G. J., M. S. Hill, and S. D. Hoffman (1988) “Welfare dependence within and 
across generations.” Science, 239(4839), 467–471. 
Ekhaugen, T. (2009) “Extracting the causal component from the intergenerational 
correlation in unemployment.” Journal of Population Economics, 22(1), 97–113. 
Edmark, K., and K. Hanspers (2011) “Is welfare dependency inherited? Estimating the 
causal welfare transmission effects using Swedish sibling data.” Working paper 
2011:25, IFAU, Uppsala. 
Gottschalk, P. (1990) “AFDC participation across generations.” The American 
Economic Review, 80(2), 367–371 
Kendler, K. S., J. Myers, and C. A. Prescott (2007) “Specificity of genetic and 
environmental risk factors for symptoms of cannabis, cocaine, alcohol, caffeine, 
and nicotine dependence.” Archives of General Psychiatry, 64(11), 1313–1320. 
Kristensen, P., T. Bjerkedal, and J. I. Brevik (2004) “Long term effects of parental 
disability: A register based life course follow-up of Norwegians born in 1967–
1976” Norsk Epidemiologi, 14(1), 97–105. 
Leonard, J. (1986) “Labor supply incentives and disincentives for disabled persons.” In 
(ed. Berkowitz, M. and M.A. Hill), Disability and the Labor Market: Economic 
problems, policies and programs, Industrial and Economic Relations Press, 
Utica, N.Y. 
Levine, P. B., and D. J. Zimmerman (1996) “The intergenerational correlation in 
AFDC participation: Welfare trap or poverty trap?” Institute for Research on 
Poverty, Discussion Paper no. 1100-96. 
Lindahl, L. (2008) “Do birth order and family size matter for intergenerational income 
mobility?” Applied Economics, 40(17), 2239–2257. 
Lorentzen, T. (2010) “Social assistance dynamics in Norway: A sibling study of 
intergenerational mobility.” Report 3 – 2010, Stein Rokkan Centre for Social 
Studies, Bergen. 
Mitnik, O. A. (2010) “Intergenerational transmission of welfare dependency: The 
effects of length of exposure.” SOLE Submission. 
Nilsen, Ø. A., K. Vaage, A. Aakvik, and K. Å. Jacobsen (2012) “Intergenerational 
earnings mobility revisited: Estimates based on lifetime earnings.” Scandinavian 
Journal of Economics, 114(1), 1–23. 
23 
 
Norwegian Institute of Public Health (2012) “Egenvurdert helse (Self-reported 
health).” http://www.fhi.no/artikler/?id=70815, downloaded 2012-02-24. 
OECD (2010a) Sickness, Disability and Work: Breaking the Barriers - A synthesis of 
findings across OECD countries, OECD Publishing, Paris. 
OECD (2010b) Health at a Glance: Europe 2010, OECD Publishing, Paris. 
Page, M. E, and A. H. Stevens (2002) “Will you miss me when i am gone? The 
economic consequences of absent parents.” NBER Working Paper No. 8786. 
Parsons, D. O. (1980) “The decline in male labor force participation.” Journal of 
Political Economy, 88(1), 117–134. 
Pepper, J. V. (2000) “The intergenerational transmission of welfare receipt: A 
nonparametric bounds analysis.” Review of Economics and Statistics, 82(3), 472–
488. 
Rege, M, K. Telle, and M. Votruba (2007) “Social interaction effects in disability 
pension participation: evidence from plant downsizing.” Research Department, 
Statistics Norway, Discussion Papers No. 496. 
Solon, G. (1999) “Intergenerational mobility in the labor market.” In (ed. Ashenfelter 
O. C., and D. Card), Handbook of Labor Economics, Vol. 3, Part 1, 1761–1800.  
Stenberg, S.-Å. (2000) “Inheritance of welfare recipiency: An intergenerational study 
of social assistance recipiency in postwar Sweden.” Journal of Marriage and 
Family, 62(1), 228–239. 
  
 Figu
Not
 
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
re 1:  
es: The disa
pension
calculat
Source:
0.0
2.0
4.0
6.0
8.0
10.0
12.0
14.0
1980
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
bility bene
 recipients 
ed based on
 NAV. 
1985
Disab
fit recipienc
as a share o
 numbers f
 
1990
ility be
24 
y rates are
f populatio
or Septemb
1995 200
nefit re
 calculated 
n aged 18–
er. 
0 2005
cipiency
as the numb
67. For 201
2010
 rate
er of disab
1, the numb
Wom
Men
  
ility 
er is 
en
25 
 
Figure 2: 
  
Notes: The disability benefit recipiency rates are calculated as the number of disability 
pension recipients as a share of population for each age group. 
Source: NAV. 
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics 
 All   Sons   Daughters   
 Obs Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Obs Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Obs Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Female 257,705 0.49 0.50 131,082  0 126,623  0 
DP before 40 257,705 0.04 0.20 131,082 0.03 0.17 126,623 0.05 0.22 
Father DP 257,705 0.44 0.50 131,082 0.44 0.50 126,623 0.44 0.50 
F DP age  15 257,705 0.02 0.14 131,082 0.02 0.13 126,623 0.02 0.14 
F DP age 16–20 257,705 0.03 0.16 131,082 0.03 0.16 126,623 0.02 0.16 
F DP age 21–30 257,705 0.18 0.38 131,082 0.18 0.38 126,623 0.18 0.39 
F DP age 31–40 257,705 0.21 0.41 131,082 0.22 0.41 126,623 0.21 0.41 
Mother DP 257,705 0.46 0.50 131,082 0.46 0.50 126,623 0.46 0.50 
M DP age  15 257,705 0.02 0.15 131,082 0.02 0.15 126,623 0.02 0.15 
M DP age 16–20 257,705 0.03 0.17 131,082 0.03 0.17 126,623 0.03 0.17 
M DP age 21–30 257,705 0.17 0.38 131,082 0.17 0.38 126,623 0.17 0.38 
M DP age 31–40 257,705 0.21 0.41 131,082 0.21 0.41 126,623 0.21 0.41 
Birth order 1 257,705 0.41 0.49 131,082 0.42 0.49 126,623 0.41 0.49 
Birth order 2 257,705 0.41 0.49 131,082 0.41 0.49 126,623 0.41 0.49 
Birth order 3 257,705 0.14 0.34 131,082 0.14 0.34 126,623 0.14 0.34 
Birth order 4+ 257,705 0.04 0.20 131,082 0.04 0.20 126,623 0.04 0.20 
1951 cohort 257,705 0.02 0.14 131,082 0.02 0.14 126,623 0.02 0.13 
1952 cohort 257,705 0.03 0.17 131,082 0.03 0.17 126,623 0.03 0.16 
1953 cohort 257,705 0.04 0.20 131,082 0.04 0.20 126,623 0.04 0.20 
1954 cohort 257,705 0.05 0.23 131,082 0.05 0.23 126,623 0.05 0.23 
1955 cohort 257,705 0.07 0.25 131,082 0.07 0.25 126,623 0.07 0.25 
1956 cohort 257,705 0.08 0.27 131,082 0.08 0.27 126,623 0.08 0.27 
1957 cohort 257,705 0.09 0.29 131,082 0.09 0.28 126,623 0.09 0.29 
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1958 cohort 257,705 0.10 0.30 131,082 0.10 0.30 126,623 0.10 0.30 
1959 cohort 257,705 0.11 0.31 131,082 0.11 0.31 126,623 0.11 0.31 
1960 cohort 257,705 0.11 0.31 131,082 0.11 0.31 126,623 0.11 0.31 
1961 cohort 257,705 0.11 0.31 131,082 0.11 0.31 126,623 0.11 0.31 
1962 cohort 257,705 0.10 0.30 131,082 0.10 0.30 126,623 0.10 0.30 
1963 cohort 257,705 0.10 0.30 131,082 0.10 0.30 126,623 0.10 0.30 
Father’s educ. 257,705 11.94 2.68 131,082 11.95 2.73 126,623 11.93 2.62 
Mother’s educ. 247,923 8.98 2.10 126,090 8.98 2.10 121,833 8.98 2.09 
Father’s age 257,705 27.87 4.00 131,082 27.86 4.00 126,623 27.87 4.00 
Mother’s age 249,814 25.19 4.07 127,032 25.18 4.07 122,782 25.20 4.06 
Family income  254,929 10.87 4.57 129,696 10.90 4.59 125,233 10.85 4.55 
Father’s cohort 257,705 1930.50 3.92 131,082 1930.48 3.92 126,623 1930.53 3.92 
Mother’s cohort 249,814 1933.20 4.21 127,032 1933.17 4.22 122,782 1933.22 4.20 
 
Notes: Family income in 10,000 1989 NOK, average for child aged 16–19. F/M DP age x–y: child aged x–y when father/mother became disabled. 
Table 2 Family characteristics by fathers’ disability status 
 DP = 0   DP = 1   
 Obs Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Obs Mean Std. 
Dev. 
 All      
Female 145,050 0.49 0.50 112,655 0.49 0.50 
Father’s educ. 145,050 12.24 2.76 112,655 11.56 2.51 
Mother’s educ. 139,727 9.26 2.23 108,196 8.62 1.85 
Father’s age 145,050 27.90 4.03 112,655 27.82 3.96 
Mother’s age 140,835 25.33 4.07 108,979 25.01 4.06 
Family income  144,325 11.78 4.68 110,604 9.69 4.14 
Father’s cohort 145,050 1930.51 3.90 112,655 1930.49 3.94 
Mother’s cohort 140,835 1933.10 4.18 108,979 1933.32 4.24 
Birth order 1 145,050 0.43 0.49 112,655 0.40 0.49 
Birth order 2 145,050 0.41 0.49 112,655 0.41 0.49 
Birth order 3 145,050 0.13 0.33 112,655 0.15 0.35 
Birth order 4+ 145,050 0.04 0.19 112,655 0.05 0.22 
 Sons   ,   
Father’s educ. 73,825 12.23 2.84 57,257 11.58 2.52 
Mother’s educ. 71,124 9.26 2.23 54,966 8.62 1.86 
Father’s age 73,825 27.91 4.02 57,257 27.80 3.97 
Mother’s age 71,665 25.33 4.07 55,367 24.99 4.07 
Family income  73,436 11.81 4.72 56,260 9.71 4.14 
Father’s cohort 73,825 1930.48 3.90 57,257 1930.47 3.94 
Mother’s cohort 71,665 1933.08 4.19 55,367 1933.30 4.25 
Birth order 1 73,825 0.43 0.49 57,257 0.40 0.49 
Birth order 2 73,825 0.41 0.49 57,257 0.40 0.49 
Birth order 3 73,825 0.13 0.33 57,257 0.15 0.35 
Birth order 4+ 73,825 0.04 0.19 57,257 0.05 0.22 
 Daughters      
Father’s educ. 71,225 12.24 2.68 55,398 11.54 2.50 
Mother’s educ. 68,603 9.26 2.23 53,230 8.61 1.84 
Father’s age 71,225 27.89 4.03 55,398 27.84 3.96 
Mother’s age 69,170 25.33 4.07 53,612 25.03 4.04 
Family income  70,889 11.74 4.65 54,344 9.67 4.14 
Father’s cohort 71,225 1930.55 3.90 55,398 1930.50 3.93 
Mother’s cohort 69,170 1933.13 4.18 53,612 1933.33 4.23 
Birth order 1 71,225 0.42 0.49 55,398 0.39 0.49 
Birth order 2 71,225 0.41 0.49 55,398 0.41 0.49 
Birth order 3 71,225 0.13 0.33 55,398 0.15 0.36 
Birth order 4+ 71,225 0.04 0.19 55,398 0.05 0.22 
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Table 3 Effect of fathers’ DP on children’s DP probability. OLS and family fixed 
effects (FE) 
 OLS    FE  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  All N = 257,705   
Father DP 0.013      
 14.86      
Female 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020 
 25.49 25.47 25.41 25.35 20.23 20.21 
F DP age  15 0.065 0.064 0.043 0.035 0.035 
  13.9 13.67 7.86 2.80 2.82 
F DP age 16–20 0.057 0.056 0.043 0.036 0.036 
  15.46 15.18 11.68 4.22 4.19 
F DP age 21–30 0.025 0.025 0.018 0.022 0.021 
  20.46 19.84 14.45 3.7.0 3.53 
F DP age 31–40 0.008 0.008 0.004 0.014 0.013 
  8.32 8.00 4.17 2.70 2.43 
  Sons N = 131,082   
Father DP 0.012      
 11.57      
F DP age  15 0.057 0.056 0.035 0.033 0.033 
  9.55 9.36 5.03 1.21 1.22 
F DP age 16–20 0.052 0.051 0.038 0.036 0.036 
  11.11 10.89 8.23 2.04 2.03 
F DP age 21–30 0.023 0.022 0.017 0.024 0.023 
  15.09 14.6 10.84 1.91 1.84 
F DP age 31–40 0.006 0.006 0.003 0.017 0.016 
  4.92 4.73 2.18 1.54 1.43 
  Daughters N = 126,623   
Father DP 0.013      
 10.26      
F DP age  15 0.074 0.072 0.051 0.038 0.039 
  10.81 10.64 6.32 1.37 1.39 
F DP age 16–20 0.063 0.061 0.049 0.036 0.036 
  11.17 10.97 8.55 1.90 1.88 
F DP age 21–30 0.028 0.027 0.02 0.021 0.02 
  14.67 14.23 10.1 1.60 1.52 
F DP age 31–40 0.011 0.01 0.006 0.012 0.011 
  6.82 6.56 3.56 1.05 0.92 
Controls:       
Birth order   X X  X 
Parents’ education, 
earnings, age 
  X   
Family fixed effects    X X 
Robust t-values clustered by family. Controlled for fathers’ and children’s cohorts.  
F DP age x–y: child aged x–y when father became disabled. Siblings sample, cohorts 1951–1963. 
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Table 4 Effect of mothers’ DP on children’s DP probability. OLS and family fixed 
effects (FE). 
 OLS    FE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  All N = 289,032   
Mother DP 0.011      
 13.24      
Female 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020 
 26.18 26.16 26.13 25.34 20.84 20.82 
M DP age  15 0.057 0.056 0.043 0.018 0.018 
  15.81 15.59 11.29 1.90 1.86 
M DP age 16–20 0.051 0.051 0.041 0.007 0.007 
  17.6 17.31 12.95 1.11 0.99 
M DP age 21–30 0.031 0.031 0.025 0.003 0.001 
  26.11 25.5 19.63 0.57 0.29 
M DP age 31–40 0.011 0.011 0.009 0.001 0.000 
  11.86 11.54 8.82 0.31 –0.09 
  Sons N = 146,976   
Mother DP 0.008      
 8.44      
M DP age  15 0.049 0.048 0.032 0.014 0.014 
  10.86 10.70 7.10 0.67 0.67 
M DP age 16–20 0.041 0.04 0.028 0.006 0.006 
  11.22 10.99 7.48 0.44 0.39 
M DP age 21–30 0.023 0.023 0.019 0.004 0.003 
  16.10 15.67 12.03 0.42 0.28 
M DP age 31–40 0.009 0.009 0.007 0.002 0.001 
  7.80 7.62 6.03 0.33 0.12 
  Daughters N = 142,056   
Mother DP 0.013      
 10.62      
M DP age  15 0.065 0.064 0.054 0.022 0.022 
  12.24 12.07 9.16 1.03 1.00 
M DP age 16–20 0.063 0.062 0.054 0.008 0.007 
  13.93 13.73 10.80 0.54 0.48 
M DP age 21–30 0.039 0.039 0.032 0.001 0.00 
  21.21 20.74 15.86 0.08 –0.04 
M DP age 31–40 0.014 0.013 0.01 –0.001 –0.002 
  9.11 8.86 6.56 –0.07 –0.24 
Controls:       
Birth order   X X  X 
Parents’ education, earnings, age  X   
Family fixed effects    X X 
Robust t-values clustered by family. Controlled for fathers’ and children’s cohorts.  
F DP age x–y: child aged x–y when father became disabled. Siblings sample, cohorts 1951–1963. 
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Table A1 Within family variation in exposure to father’s or mother’s DP. 
 Father DP  Mother DP   
Child age when parent 
becomes DP 
Same Other Total Same Other Total Total 
        
Never 142,108 2,408 144,516  154,315 6,024 160,339  160,339  
1–15 3,050 1,829 4,879  4,504 2,602 7,106  7,106  
16–20 1,652 4,793 6,445  2,664 7,040 9,704  9,704  
21–30 23,750 22,722 46,472  28,051 23,647 51,698  51,698  
31–40 32,688 22,705 55,393  35,347 24,838 60,185  60,185  
Total 203,248 54,457 257,705  224,881 64,151 289,032  289,032  
Same: exposed at same age as siblings. Other: exposed at different age from siblings (at least one sibling). 
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Table A2 Effect of fathers’ DP on children’s DP probability. Full sample including single children. OLS. 
 All   Sons   Daughters   
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
          
Father DP 0.013   0.012   0.014   
 17.03   13.13   11.73   
Female 0.021 0.02 0.021       
 29.3 29.25 29.54       
F DP age  15 0.07 0.05  0.063 0.043  0.077 0.057 
  16.67 9.94  11.60 6.65  12.65 7.66 
F DP age 16–20 0.057 0.043  0.051 0.036  0.063 0.049 
  17.45 13.09  12.29 8.95  12.75 9.76 
F DP age 21–30 0.027 0.02  0.024 0.018  0.03 0.021 
  24.50 17.40  17.73 12.79  17.68 12.29 
F DP age 31–40 0.009 0.005  0.007 0.003  0.011 0.007 
  9.94 5.42  6.14 3.03  7.92 4.52 
N 334,995 334,995 318,499 170,340 170,340 161,939 164,655 164,655 156,560 
Robust t-values clustered by family. Controlled for fathers’ and children’s cohorts. Columns (3) controlled for parents’ education and age, and family income.  
F DP age x–y: child aged x–y when father became disabled.  
33 
 
Table A3 Effect of mothers’ DP on children’s DP probability. Full sample including single children. OLS. 
 All   Sons   Daughters  
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
          
Mother 
DP 
0.01   0.007   0.012   
 13.47   8.09   11.1   
Female 0.02 0.02 0.021       
 30.45 30.44 29.55       
M DP age  15 0.059 0.047  0.05 0.035  0.068 0.058
  19.03 13.95  12.7 8.71  14.84 11.2
M DP age 16–20 0.053 0.042  0.039 0.027  0.067 0.058
  20.63 15.24  12.48 8.24  16.76 13.06
M DP age 21–30 0.032 0.026  0.024 0.019  0.04 0.033
  30.2 23.09  18.34 14.18  24.6 18.51
M DP age 31–40 0.012 0.009  0.008 0.007  0.015 0.012
  13.89 10.43  8.04 6.19  11.53 8.48
N 374,307 374,307 318,486 190,301 190,301 161,933 184,006 184,006 156,553
Robust t-values clustered by family. Controlled for mothers’ and children’s cohorts. Columns (3) controlled for parents’ education and age, and family income.  
M DP age x–y: child aged x–y when mother became disabled. 
 
Table A4 Effect of fathers’ DP on children’s DP probability. OLS and family 
fixed effects (FE). Cohorts 1957–1963. 
 OLS    FE  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  All N = 183,345   
Father DP 0.012      
 12.09      
Female 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
 21.44 21.48 21.43 22.31 14.91 14.9 
F DP age  10 0.062 0.061 0.039 0.022 0.022 
  8.16 8.01 4.05 0.94 0.96 
F DP age 11–20 0.058 0.057 0.042 0.034 0.034 
  16.78 16.48 11.59 2.53 2.49 
F DP age 21–30 0.024 0.023 0.017 0.025 0.023 
  17.53 16.96 12.13 2.34 2.22 
F DP age 31–40 0.007 0.007 0.003 0.02 0.018 
  5.70 5.39 2.35 2.05 1.88 
  Sons N = 92,829   
Father DP 0.012      
 9.38      
F DP age  10 0.054 0.053 0.033 0.021 0.021 
  5.61 5.48 2.72 0.38 0.39 
F DP age 11–20 0.051 0.05 0.035 0.037 0.037 
  11.63 11.38 7.82 1.09 1.08 
F DP age 21–30 0.022 0.021 0.016 0.026 0.025 
  12.94 12.48 9.17 0.99 0.94 
F DP age 31–40 0.005 0.004 0.001 0.023 0.021 
  2.93 2.72 0.77 0.92 0.86 
  Daughters N = 90,516   
Father DP 0.013      
 8.24      
F DP age  10 0.07 0.069 0.045 0.022 0.023 
  6.14 6.05 3.08 0.36 0.37 
F DP age 11–20 0.066 0.065 0.049 0.032 0.031 
  12.5 12.3 8.77 0.91 0.89 
F DP age 21–30 0.026 0.025 0.018 0.024 0.022 
  12.39 12.03 8.34 0.89 0.83 
F DP age 31–40 0.01 0.01 0.005 0.018 0.016 
  5.01 4.78 2.38 0.73 0.65 
Controls:       
Birth order  X X  X 
Parents’ education, 
earnings, age 
  X   
Family fixed effects    X X 
Robust t-values clustered by family. Controlled for fathers’ and children’s cohorts. 
F DP age x–y: child aged x–y when father became disabled. Siblings sample, cohorts 1957–1963. 
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Table A5 Effect of mothers’ DP on children’s DP probability. OLS and family 
fixed effects (FE). Cohorts 1957–1963. 
 OLS    FE  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  All N = 200,963   
Mother DP 0.011      
 11.61      
Female 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.021 0.02 0.02 
 21.63 21.62 21.59 22.26 15.03 15.01 
M DP age  10 0.057 0.056 0.043 0.021 0.021 
  9.85 9.71 6.97 1.00 1.00 
M DP age 11–20 0.054 0.053 0.042 0.003 0.002 
  19.1 18.75 13.92 0.3 0.23 
M DP age 21–30 0.031 0.03 0.025 0.005 0.004 
  22.63 22.00 17.10 0.71 0.55 
M DP age 31–40 0.011 0.011 0.009 0.004 0.002 
  9.3 9.01 6.88 0.66 0.42 
  Sons N = 101,669   
Mother DP 0.009      
 7.87      
M DP age  10 0.057 0.056 0.041 0.014 0.014 
  7.38 7.28 5.07 0.24 0.24 
M DP age 11–20 0.043 0.042 0.029 0.000 0.000 
  12.3 12.04 8.06 0.01 -0.01 
M DP age 21–30 0.024 0.023 0.019 0.001 0.000 
  14.29 13.84 10.94 0.05 -0.02 
M DP age 31–40 0.01 0.009 0.007 0.006 0.004 
  6.33 6.15 4.70 0.40 0.30 
  Daughters N = 99,294   
Mother DP 0.013      
 8.81      
M DP age  10 0.057 0.056 0.045 0.029 0.029 
  6.81 6.7 4.85 0.56 0.56 
M DP age 11–20 0.066 0.065 0.056 0.005 0.004 
  15.02 14.78 11.58 0.19 0.16 
M DP age 21–30 0.038 0.037 0.030 0.008 0.007 
  17.97 17.51 13.38 0.43 0.37 
M DP age 31–40 0.013 0.013 0.010 0.001 0.000 
  6.95 6.73 5.12 0.09 0.00 
Controls:       
Birth order  X X  X 
Parents’ education, 
earnings, age 
  X   
Family fixed effects    X X 
Robust t-values clustered by family. Controlled for mothers’ and children’s cohorts. 
M DP age x–y: child aged x–y when mother became disabled. Siblings sample, cohorts 1957–1963. 
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Table A6 Effect of fathers’ DP on children’s DP probability. Stable families. OLS 
and family fixed effects (FE). 
 OLS    FE  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  All N =    
Father DP 0.011      
 13.2      
Female 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020 
 24.58 24.57 24.52 24.38 19.44 19.42 
F DP age  15 0.058 0.057 0.041 0.028 0.028 
  11.28 11.07 6.98 2.05 2.08 
F DP age 16–20 0.05 0.049 0.041 0.028 0.028 
  12.46 12.17 10.16 3.09 3.08 
F DP age 21–30 0.024 0.023 0.018 0.02 0.019 
  18.6 18.02 13.92 3.23 3.08 
F DP age 31–40 0.008 0.008 0.005 0.013 0.012 
  8.20 7.89 4.40 2.43 2.18 
  Sons N = 114,604   
Father DP 0.01      
 9.65      
F DP age  15 0.052 0.05 0.033 0.026 0.027 
  7.88 7.68 4.47 0.90 0.92 
F DP age 16–20 0.045 0.044 0.035 0.032 0.032 
  9.03 8.78 7.19 1.65 1.65 
F DP age 21–30 0.021 0.02 0.016 0.023 0.022 
  13.06 12.6 9.82 1.71 1.63 
F DP age 31–40 0.006 0.006 0.003 0.016 0.015 
  4.84 4.66 2.07 1.37 1.25 
  Daughters N = 110,678   
Father DP 0.013      
 9.56      
F DP age  15 0.065 0.064 0.049 0.031 0.031 
  8.7 8.57 5.66 0.97 0.98 
F DP age 16–20 0.055 0.054 0.046 0.024 0.023 
  9.09 8.9 7.51 1.18 1.17 
F DP age 21–30 0.028 0.027 0.021 0.018 0.017 
  13.86 13.46 10.22 1.30 1.23 
F DP age 31–40 0.011 0.011 0.007 0.011 0.01 
  6.7 6.44 3.94 0.90 0.79 
Controls:       
Birth order  X X  X 
Parents’ education, 
earnings, age 
  X   
Family fixed effects    X X 
Robust t-values clustered by family. Controlled for fathers’ and children’s cohorts. 
F DP age x–y: child aged x–y when father became disabled. Parents married throughout child’s 
adolescence. 
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Table A7 Effect of mothers’ DP on children’s DP probability. Stable families. 
OLS and family fixed effects (FE). 
 OLS    FE  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  All N = 234,475   
Mother DP 0.009      
 10.24      
Female 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
 24.81 24.78 24.73 24.39 19.83 19.82 
M DP age  15 0.047 0.046 0.038 –0.001 –0.001 
  11.67 11.44 9.29 –0.05 –0.04 
M DP age 16–20 0.045 0.044 0.037 –0.003 –0.003 
  13.1 12.82 10.65 -0.38 –0.44 
M DP age 21–30 0.029 0.028 0.023 –0.004 –0.005 
  21.93 21.33 17.33 –0.83 –1.02 
M DP age 31–40 0.011 0.011 0.008 –0.003 –0.004 
  10.73 10.39 8.17 –0.85 –1.16 
  Sons N = 119,263   
Mother DP 0.006      
 5.66      
M DP age  15 0.036 0.035 0.028 0.002 0.002 
  7.29 7.12 5.75 0.06 0.06 
M DP age 16–20 0.028 0.027 0.021 0.002 0.001 
  7.22 6.98 5.29 0.09 0.06 
M DP age 21–30 0.02 0.019 0.016 0 –0.001 
  12.99 12.58 10.18 –0.01 –0.09 
M DP age 31–40 0.009 0.008 0.007 –0.002 –0.003 
  6.94 6.75 5.28 –0.43 –0.65 
  Daughters N = 115,212   
Mother DP 0.012      
 8.82      
M DP age  15 0.059 0.058 0.048 –0.003 –0.003 
  9.47 9.31 7.57 –0.12 –0.12 
M DP age 16–20 0.061 0.06 0.053 –0.008 –0.008 
  11.3 11.12 9.54 –0.48 –0.50 
M DP age 21–30 0.037 0.037 0.03 –0.009 –0.009 
  18.17 17.72 14.35 –0.79 –0.88 
M DP age 31–40 0.013 0.013 0.01 –0.005 –0.006 
  8.33 8.04 6.31 –0.58 –0.74 
Controls:       
Birth order  X X  X 
Parents’ education, 
earnings, age 
  X   
Family fixed effects    X X 
Robust t-values clustered by family. Controlled for mothers’ and children’s cohorts. 
M DP age x–y: child aged x–y when mother became disabled. Parents married throughout child’s 
adolescence.  
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